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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a traffic game where many atomic agents try to optimize their utilities by choosing the route
with the least travel cost, and propose an actor-critic-based adaptive learning algorithm that converges to İ-Nash equilibrium 
with high probability in traffic games. The model consists of an N-person repeated game where each player knows his action 
space and the realized payoffs he has experienced but is unaware of the information about the action(s) he did not select. We 
formulate this traffic game as a stochastic congestion game and propose a naive user algorithm for finding a pure Nash 
equilibrium. An analysis of the convergence is based on Markov chain. Finally, using a single origin-destination network 
connected by some overlapping paths, the validity of the proposed algorithm is tested.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Delft University of 
Technology.
Keywords: traffic games; atomic user; naive user algorithm; pure Nash equilibrium; network simulation
1. Introduction
This paper is motivated by behavioral experiments on travelers’ route-choice that was conducted by Selten et 
al. [18]. Their experimental results clarify the problems involved in the assumptions that has been made in the 
traditional procedures for modeling of travelers’ route choice behaviors: 1) each user knows his utility function, 
2) each user knows other users’ utility functions, 3) each user observes other users’ behavior, 4) each user can 
compute the minimum path based on the average travel time on each link, and 5) all users know that there exists 
an equilibrium in the system. We introduce the concept of a naïve user, for whom we don’t require any of the 
above assumptions to describe. On the other hand, we define an informed-user as a person that assumptions (1)
and (3) can be applied to.
This paper is also stimulated by an agent-based route choice model based on cellular automata for vehicle
traffic flow [15,16], in which travelers’ trip costs are determined by simulation-based experience not by artificial
link cost functions and are stochastically changeable. In order to relate the results of traffic flow simulation to the
route choice behavior of the traveler, we need a model on how each traveler forms his expectation from realized
travel times that are obtained by day-to-day travel experiences.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a naïve user algorithm which describes the route-choice behaviors of a
user in a traffic network comprised of a number of discrete, interactive decision-makers. We describe the traffic 
game as a state-independent stochastic game. This implies that our model is essentially a repeated game. The 
learning process of the naive user is closer to the so-called reinforcement learning [2, 19] though it differs in the 
way that simultaneous moves of more than three persons are involved in the game so that the process is
inherently non-stationary. A naïve user algorithm is conceptually similar with a particle SUE [16], however, our 
approach includes a forward-looking behavior in trip costs and doesn’t make the assumption that there is an
equilibrium in the system. In fact, we show in this paper that there doesn’t always exist a pure Nash equilibrium.
For the naive user problem with non-atomic games, Leslie and Collins proposed the multiple-timescales
algorithm [10] and the individual Q-learning algorithm [11]. Cominetti et al. [5] used almost the same approach
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Delft University of Technology
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
807 Toshihiko Miyagi et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  80 ( 2013 )  806 – 817 
 
as Leslie and Collins and proved that a logit learning rule converges to a unique equilibrium point under the 
condition on the dispersion parameter (hereafter we call it as a logit-parameter) included in the logit choice 
model. The individual Q-learning algorithms [11] and the algorithm adopted in Cominetti et al. [5] are called the 
payoff-based algorithm where only the payoff evolution process is allowed to evolve. In addition, in both 
approaches, the determination of the logit-parameter is inconsistent with the assumption of the naive user in the 
sense that the determination of logit-parameter requires more than the information that an individual can obtain 
through his experiences. Marden et al. [12] proposed a simple payoff-based algorithm for the naive user problem 
that converges to a pure Nash equilibrium with probability 1U  . Their model is characterized by a model-free 
approach and by a realized payoff-based model, not the estimated payoff-based used in this paper. Our approach 
is similar with their method, but provides a more general model that includes their model as a special case. The 
convergence proof is also different.  
A naïve user algorithm proposed here is a natural extension of the informed-user algorithms by Miyagi and 
Peque [13] and aims to provide a combined learning algorithm for finding a pure Nash equilibrium in the 
congested network with atomic users. Our algorithm includes a simultaneous updating scheme of payoff learning 
and strategy learning with autonomously updating logit-parameter. This means that the estimated payoffs must 
be consistent with those that are used in the mixed strategies. However, the users doesn’t know the payoffs that 
they have not selected, and the cost functions as well. Therefore, we cannot use a fixed point algorithm proposed 
by Cantrarella [4]. Our algorithm relies on best response with the estimated payoffs that are recursively updated 
by a stochastic approximation scheme. We will show that the algorithm converges to a İ-Nash equilibrium. The 
convergence proof is based on Markov chain. 
In our naive user algorithms, we use a logit model derived from stochastic fictitious play. The logit-parameter  
is recursively updated based on regret defined by the realized payoffs [7]. Therefore, if each user successfully 
selects a better action, the regret asymptotically converges to a very small number, and identification ability of 
each user to select the best action is improved. 
 This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the notation and definition related to traffic games. 
Section 3 is the main part of this paper; therein we discuss the naive-user algorithm and show its convergence 
property. Section 4 shows simulations of the test network with a single origin-destination and 3 routes, we 
simulated the case of both using linear and non-linear link cost functions, respectively. In addition, in order to 
show that the algorithm is useful in a generic user equilibrium problem, computational examples in cases of 
networks with multi-user, step-cost function and cost function with asymmetric Jacobian, respectively are 
presented. In the last section, we provide our concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Notation and definition 
 
Let {1, , , , }I i n ! ! and {1, , , , },i iA k m i I  ! ! , denote the set of players and the set of actions of 
player ,i  respectively. We interchangeably use a notation i ia A  and ik A to represent a generic element 
of .iA We use the conventional notation i ia A   to describe the action taken by the opponents of ,i  ia , 
where iA is the action set of the opponent(s) of player .i The action profile is a vector denoted by 
1( , , , , )i Na a a a A! ! , or ( , )i ia a a A  where 1 NA A u uA " . The payoff (or utility) of player i in a 
one-shot game is determined by the function :iu oA \ . 
Suppose that at the end of each stage, player i  observes a sample itU which is a realized payoff that player 
i  receives at stage .t  We assume that the realized payoff consists of the average payoff ( , )i i iu a a  and a 
choice specific random term ( ).i itaH That is, 
( , ) ( )i i i i i it t t t tU u a a aH
   
where ( )iu < is the real-valued function and ( )i itaH is a component of the random variables vector 
1( , , ) .i
i i i i T
t t jt M t
H H H H ! !  An analyst knows the functional form of each user’s payoff function, ( ),iu a however 
each of the users doesn’t. 
Consider a discrete time process 0{ }t t!U of vectors. At each stage ,t  all players having observed the past 
realizations 1 1, , tU U! , choose the actions ta in .A  The objective of player i  is to maximize the expected 
payoff define by 
1
1lim inf
t
i
st s
U
tof  
ª º
« »¬ ¼
¦  (2) 
(1) 
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A mixed strategy ( )i it aS represents the probability that player i  chooses an action 
ia  at time ,t i.e.  
( ) Pr[ ].i i i it ta a aS    
Definition 1 (Naive user). Each user doesn’t know his/her payoff function and those of other travelers as well. 
In addition, each user does not know the state and the number of participants of the game. The only information 
available to him/her is the realized payoff that he/she has used at that day, ( )i itU a . 
In standard game theory, each player is assumed to have a belief that her opponents’ behave independently 
accordingly to mixed strategies so that the average payoff in the mixed strategy space is written as: 
( ) [ ( )] ( ) ( )i i i j j
A j I
u u u aS S
 
  ¦ 
a
ʌ D D  
(A mixed) Nash equilibrium is achieved when each player plays a best response to the opponent strategies, so 
that  
* *( ) max ( , )i i
i i i i
a A
u u aS 

 ʌ  
Definition 2 (Pure Nash equilibrium). A pure Nash equilibrium of a game is defined as an action profile that 
satisfies the condition: 
* *( ) max ( , )i i
i i i i
a A
u u a 

 a a  
A traffic game with atomic flow was proposed by Rosenthal [17] and is well known as a (deterministic) 
congestion game. Congestion game is a special case of potential game [14], and has a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. Congestion game is also known to be a special case of weakly acyclic game [20, 21] and has the 
property that for any action a A , there exists a better reply path starting at a and ending at some pure Nash 
equilibrium of the game [12, 20]. On the other hand, the properties of stochastic traffic games are not so much 
known. We are interested in the learning rule such that when used by all the users, stage-by-stage play converges 
to pure Nash equilibrium play most of the time. 
 
 
3. Adaptive learning algorithms for congestion games 
 
3.1. Flow and cost 
 
We begin with flow conservation equations in traffic games with atomic flow. For simplicity purposes, 
throughout this paper we will restrict our attention to a single origin-destination (O-D) pair connected by paths 
(routes). Each player shares a set of facilities (or link) of the transportation network, L . The action space of 
player i I  is 2 LiA  . That is, a player’s action corresponds to choosing a path ik A  that consists of a set 
of link on that path, kA . The number of visits to path ik A  by player i  at time t is denoted by a 0-1 
variable and defined by 
, { }
i i
k t tz a k  1  
where { }1 < is the indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the statement in the parenthesis is true, and zero, 
otherwise. Therefore, the number of players who use link A  is a positive integer value and given as 
, , , ,
i
i
t k k t
i I k A
f z LG
 
  ¦¦A A A  
where ,{ }kGA  is an element of the link-path incidence matrix. 
Equation (8) can be equivalently expressed by using link-path incidence matrix as:            
, , ,
i
i
t k k t
i I k A
f zG
 
 ¦¦A A  
An analyst may formulate link travel cost on LA  as a real-valued non-decreasing function, ( )C fA . Travel 
cost of path k A  is defined as 
,
:
( )
i
i i
k k
k
k A
c CZ G


 ¦ fA A
A
, 
where iZ denotes the value of time of user .i  We define the payoff of path k as
i i
k ku c  . Thus, the payoff 
function is no longer continuous with respect to the flow. By using the experienced payoff of user i at time ,t
the action specific average payoff, ,itU  received by user i at time t (excluded) is given by 
1
, ,
0,
1ˆ
t
i i i
k t s k si
sk t
u U z
Z

 
 ¦  
(4) 
(5) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(3) 
(6) 
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where ( )itZ k  denotes the number of visits of path k  up to t  defined as: 
1
, ,
0
t
i i
k t k s
s
Z z

 
 ¦  
Then we can show that 
1
, , 1 1 , 1
,
{ }ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
i
i i i it
k t k t t k ti
k t
a k
u u U u
Z

  
 
  
1  
Proof is shown in Appendix A. 
 
3.2. Stochastic congestion games 
 
In a naive user environment, since users will always judge their best action based on the estimated payoffs 
ˆ ( ),iu k  they would take a probabilistic rather than a deterministic behavior. Following Fudenberg and Levine [6], 
we define the smooth best response function obtained by solving 
, , ,ˆarg max ( )ii i
i i i i i i
k t k t k t tk A
x uS P\
6
ª º ¬ ¼¦ʌ ʌ  
where 0iP ! is a person-dependent, smoothing parameter and : ( )i iA\ ' o \ is a private information of 
player ,i  which is a smooth, strictly differentiable concave function. A typical example of the private 
information function is the entropy function 
( ) logii i i ik kk A\ S S S ¦ . 
Then the following logit functions are derived: 
^ `
^ `
,
,
,
ˆexp /
, ,
ˆexp /
i
i i
k ti i
k t i i
m t
m A
u
x k A i I
u
P
P

  
¦
 
Since we don’t know the explicit relations between x  and uˆ  in (12), we cannot find the equilibrium state 
of the choice structure. In addition to this, in order for , 0{ }
i
k t tx t  to be the best response for user ,i  it is 
necessary that the recursively estimated payoffs asymptotically approximate the realized payoffs. To achieve this, 
we use the stochastic approximation theory [3, 9]. 
Note that (10) includes a person-dependent random variable ,
i
k tZ  that changes according to user 'i s choice 
history. We approximate (10) with the following updating scheme: 
 
, 1 , 1 ,
,
{ }ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
i
i i i it
k t k t t t k ti
k t
a k
u u U u
x
O 
 
  
1
 
where
 
for each i , 0{ }
i
t tO ! is 
a deterministic sequence satisfying  
2
0 0
, ( )i it t
t t
O O
t t
 f  f¦ ¦  
The convergence property of (13a) can be approximated by ordinary differential equations (ODE) [9]. If the 
system is in a stationary process wherein each user acts independently and assumes that other users keep their 
previous actions, the estimated payoffs will converge to the expected values of the realized payoffs (see 
Appendix B for a detailed discussion). In a more general case where all users change their actions 
simultaneously, the system exhibits a non-stationary process. Leslie and Collins [10,11] proved that the 
parameter tO in (13a) should be a user specific parameter { }
i
tO  and the following additional condition is 
required, 
1 0
i
t
i
t
as t
O
O 
o of  
Using the theorem on the perturbed ODE proposed by Benaim [1], Leslie and Collins [11] provided the 
following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1. The values 1ˆtu  resulting from (13a) with the user-specific parameter tO  converges almost surely 
to a connected internally chain-recurrent set of the flow defined by the singularly perturbed ODE provided that 
the 1ˆtu remain bounded for all time. 
 
 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13a) 
(13b) 
(13c) 
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3.3. A naive user algorithm 
 
3.3.1. Markov Learning Process 
 
We consider a general class of congestion games where each player takes a better response strategy rather 
than a best response. Better response may be rational in cases where each user’s behavior is perturbed due to 
private information and/or that link cost is dependent on the flows on other links. Our approach is based on the 
Markov learning model which describes the transition process where a state of the game is the level of a learner. 
At each time step t = 1, 2,.., let ts  denote the state of the game. We define the state variable s as the number of 
learners, that is, the players whose the best replies in two consecutive steps are in accordance with and the 
( )n s out of the n  players as non-learners. We label the action choice of non-learners, zero. On the other 
hand, a learner is the player who has succeeded in finding the best reply. The learner is going to stay with the 
action in the succeeding steps. We label the action of the learner, one. Figure 1 shows the state transitions for 
three persons with zero and one actions. This traffic game is a weakly acyclic game [20, 21] and does not 
necessarily have the finite improvement property because the graph includes a cycle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A weakly acyclic property in the state transition 
 
Let sp  denote the probability that a player chooses the best action in a state .s  Thus, (1 )sp  represents 
the probability that a player will fail to choose the best action. Then, the transition probability is given as 
> @1Pr 1 | 1 , 0 1t t s
n ss s s p for s n
n
    d d   
The remaining transition probabilities are depicted in figure 2. In the figure we implicitly assume that  
> @1Pr ' | 1 0, ' { 1, , 1}t ts s s for s s s s        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
Figure 2. Transition probabilities 
 
Although an analyst knows the current state, each player does not know which state he is currently in. This 
Markov chain model has nice properties, it is irreducible and aperiodic, and converges to a steady transition 
probability Ȗ  that can be found by solving the following equation [8].  
000 
100 010 001 
110 011 101 
111 
s=0 
s=1 
s=2 
s=3 
ts s   1 1ts s  1 1ts s  
 (1 ), 1s
s p s n
n
 d d
1(1 ) , 0s s
n s sp p s n
n n 
   d d   
, 0 1s
n s p s n
n
 d d 
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1
0
1 1
1
s s
s s
n
s
s
pn s and
s p
J
J
J

 
§ ·§ · ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹© ¹
 ¦
 
 
3.3.2. Algorithm 
 
We consider the process such that given the action profile and the resultant action values, 0 0{ , },a U
0{ , }t t t!a U are sequentially generated. Suppose that player i  only knows the realized payoff { }
i
tU  at each stage 
0t ! . Since behavioral strategies are time-dependent and simultaneously changed, users encounter a 
non-stationary environment. At the initial stage 0t  , each user randomly selects the initial action 0
ia . User i  
assigns it as his tentative best action (TBA) at * 1 01, .
i it k a a   At each subsequent time step, a randomly 
selected user, say user i , chooses his tentative best action *k by exploration and includes it in the set of best 
actions 
* * ˆ{ : arg max ( )}
i i
i i i i
t
a A
B k A k u a

    
where a vector ˆ iu  is given by (15). User i  chooses his tentative best action (TBA) *k by the following rule:
 
 
*
* *
( ) (1 ),
( )
(1 ( )) / ( 1),
i i i
ti i
t i ii
t
x a for a k
a
x k for all a kA
H H
S
H
­    ° ®
  z°¯
 
where H  is an arbitrary small positive number. The choice probabilities of TBA is given as
 
^ ` *ˆ( ) exp ( ) / ,i i i i i it tx a K u a for a kP   
where K is the normalization factor.  The logit-parameter itP is updated by
 
1 1
1
max[ , ]
1( ), where
1with .
i i
t t
i i i i i i i
t t t t t t t
t
i i
t s
s
R R U U
t
U U
t
PP H P
P P P 
 
 
    
 ¦
 
Equation (18) means that the logit-parameter in our algorithm is autonomously updated according to the users’ 
experiences. The regret itR  approaches zero as stage t  becomes a very large value [7]. The new action profile
ta is generated according to the mixed strategy .tʌ  The first equation in (16) implies that user i  assigns at least 
the probability *( )ix kH  to each action and reinforces the TBA by assigning the increment. If we put 
( ) 1/ ,i i ix a A this scheme is equivalent to what is called the H  greedy algorithm in reinforcement learning 
[19]. Equation (16) together with (17) represents the re-planning (or adaptive learning) process of user i  
depending on the case if he has succeeded in choosing the best action or has failed.  
An alternative for determining the best response set is as follows. Suppose that each user saves in his memory 
the payoffs that he has received up to 1t   and searches the maximum value among them, 
,max 0 1max ( ), .
i i i i i
t s t s sU U a a A d    
The next action of user i  is determined by comparing the actual payoff received, ( ),i itU a  with the maximum 
received payoff, ,max ,
i
tU and is updated as follows: 
,max
1 *
,max
, ( )
.
, ( )
i i i i
t t ti
t i i i
t t
a U a U
a
k U a U
­ !° ®
d°¯
 
If the TBA is repeated, the user stays there in the subsequent time periods. If the selected action according to 
the mixed strategy is not consistent with the TBA, each user chooses the TBA cautiously according to the 
conditional logit model (16) and (17).  
 
3.4. Convergence property 
 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
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Proposition. Suppose that the congestion game has a pure Nash equilibrium. Then the action profile ta
JHQHUDWHGE\WKHQDLYHXVHUDOJRULWKPFRQYHUJHVWRİ-Nash equilibrium with probability 1U   for a sufficiently 
small H  and for all sufficiently large times t .  
Sketch of proof: First, for the stationary probabilities, it holds that 
1
11 , 0 1ss s
s
ps s n
n s p
J 
 d d 

Ȗ  
where *1 (1 )s sp xH   and 
*
sx  is a choice probability which is assigned to the tentative best response path at 
state s. Let 0min s n sp pd d  be the lower bound of the probabilities of selecting a tentative best action. We can 
choose H  to ensure (1 ) / 1.p pK     If we choose 1/ ,nH d  then it holds that 
0 1 .n nd d dȖ Ȗ Ȗ"  
Assume that the final state where all players achieve in finding the best responses occurs with probability one, 
that is, 1n U  Ȗ . This involves 0 1 0n   Ȗ Ȗ" and that all users almost surely converge to pure Nash 
equilibrium. This can occur in the informed user problem, however, in the naive user problem U  must be less 
than one. From (21), for a given ,nJ U we can build the sequential equations 1 0{ , , }nJ J !  and the sum of 
those values  
1
2
0
1
1 1 1
2 2
.
n
n
s
s
n
s
s
n nn n n
n
n
s
J K K K U
U K

 
 
§   ·§ ·+     ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹© ¹
§ ·
 ¨ ¸
© ¹
¦
¦
" "
 
Using the binomial formula, we have 
^ `(1 ) 1 .nH U K    
Thus, we have 
^ `*1 1 (1 ) 1
(1 )
n
n xU HK
    

 
If the minimum choice probability that is assigned to the tentative best action *x is close to one, then the 
probability of the state that all users succeed in finding their best paths, ,U  approaches to very close value of 
one. However, adopting a very small value of H  brings in a negative effect. At the relatively early stages of the 
iteration a user will assign a very high probability to the wrong path and fixes it. The algorithm should be 
constructed to allow some users to be in their suboptimal states. If you add the lower ranked probabilities, which 
means that some users are allowed to achieve better responses, that is, 1 ,n n n sU J J J    "  then H Nash 
equilibrium can be achieved with relatively high probability. 
 
 
4. Simulations 
 
The proposed algorithm is applied to a single origin-destination (O-D) network using linear and non-linear 
cost functions on the links, respectively. The network has 5 links and 3 routes; this translates to 3 actions 
available for each player. Players must traverse from node O to node D and must do this repeatedly until they 
converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. The network models the complex interaction of players using the links and 
the proposed algorithm ensures that this complex interaction leads to an efficient use of more general networks. 
 
4.1. Test network and link cost functions 
 
We use a Braess-network shown in Figure 3. We pay attention to the single O-D case where the flow 
conservation equation is described as 1 2 3 ,n h h h   where n is the number of trips and , {1, 2, 3}kh k    
denotes the thi  path flow. The following linear link cost functions are assumed: 
1 1 2 2 3,1 : 4  2 : 50  3 5, : 0link C f link C f link C     3 4 4 4 :, ,4l nk Cf i f and 5 52 , 5 : 8link C f   
where ( )C A  is the travel cost of link A and fA  is the aggregated link flow on link A . Under the condition 
that link costs are monotone increasing, and continuously differentiable with flow, there exists a unique Wardrop 
equilibrium that is consistent with a mixed Nash equilibrium. However, in network with atomic users, that is not 
(21) 
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the case. We selected an example that there is a unique atomic UE. For the non-linear link cost functions, we
assume the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) type-cost function, 
  40 (1 0.15( ) ),ll l l
l
f
K
CC f  
where 0lC is the free flow travel time, lK is the capacity of link A .
Figure 3. Test network
4.2. Simulation for a basic network
Figure 4 depicts the flow variation among the three paths ( the vertical axis represents flow). The resulting 
equilibrium flow vector is * (4,  2,  4)h  , which is the exact values of the Wardrop equilibrium flow on this
network. Different from the informed user problem, the naive user problem path flows fluctuate for a long time
but with diminishing flow-variation. This implies that it takes a long time for drivers to learn the correct values 
of the travel costs and that after a better response path converges to a pure NE, the best action periodically moves 
from the point to neighboring points around the NE point. This characterizes a connected internally
chain-recurrent set of the best action.
Figure 4. Flow variations
In figure 5 each edge of each cell corresponds to a state of potential field. The figure shows a better response
path starting from the big red dot to a unique absorbing point (a pure NE) designated by a green dot. Since the 
initial starting point is randomly selected, the better response path takes different trajectory during each
simulation.
(22)
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4.3. Multi-user network with different values of time 
 
Figure 6 shows the flow variation of the same network with 10 users. In figure 4, users had the same value of 
time, 1.Z  In figure 6, 4 of the 10 users had a value of time 1.5Z   while the remaining users had 1.Z   
The equilibrium in this network is [3 4 3] where [ 1 2 3  h h h ] represents route 1, route 2 and route 3, respectively. 
Users with value of time 1.5Z  chose the 2nd route where a toll is to be paid while the remaining users choose 
the routes without a toll. This simulation shows that the users with a higher value of time are willing to pay to 
arrive at their destination faster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. A better response path from starting point (red dot) to the final point (green dot) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Flow variations on a network with 10 users with different values of time 
 
4.4. Network with an asymmetric Jacobian link cost 
 
In figure 7, we let the same network use asymmetric Jacobian link costs. Asymmetric Jacobian link costs are 
used to model multimodal and multiclass networks which provide a more realistic user interaction. In this 
network, we have 10 users with an equilibrium of [5 1 4]. The values of time for all users is 1.Z   The 
following linear link cost functions were used: 
 C A Bf  
where 
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Figure 7. Flow variations on a network with 10 users using asymmetric Jacobian link costs 
 
4.5 Network with a step cost function 
 
In figure 8, we used the same network with 10 users but this time using a step cost function. The equilibrium 
in this setting is [4 2 4] and all the users have the same value of time 1.Z  The link costs assumed were the 
same except for link 5 which is dependent on the number of users, 5 ,f  where 5 17C  if 5 2,f d 5 21C  if 
5 3,f d 5 28C  if 5 4,f d 5 35C  if 5 6,f d else 5 515 .C f   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Flow variations on a network with 10 users using a step cost function 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
A naive user algorithm simulates agents’ route choice behavior in a realistic and plausible traffic condition 
where each agent determines its best action based on traffic information obtained through his own experiences. 
The learning process in the naive user problem is closer to the reinforcement learning in machine learning 
though it differs in the way that simultaneous moves of more than three persons are involved in the game so that 
the process is inherently non-stationary. This paper proposed a naive user algorithm for finding the İ-Nash 
equilibrium in a congested transportation network. Our algorithm is applicable to a large scale network by using 
the k-path minimum search. Dial algorithm is an alternative for determining action space. Once, the action space 
is determined, our algorithm no longer requires further exploration of finding minimum-paths. This may bring in 
a dramatic reduction of computing time. On the other hand, our algorithm needs a large number of iterations to 
adjust predicted action-values. Although stochastic approximation theory is useful to build the prediction of 
action-values, further updating is necessary to reduce computing time. In our model, logit-type model or model 
free approach is selective for finding the best action. A model free approach is recommendable for practical use 
but the setting of parameter associated with ‘inertia’ is still open to question. Our approach is an atomic-based 
model so that it is useful in bridging the route choice behaviors to the network simulator using a cellular 
automaton that are used in transportation planning packages like MATSim (Multi-Agent Transport Simulation) 
and TRANSIMS (TRansportation ANalysis and SIMulation System). In this paper, we have restricted our 
attention to the atomic model, however, the same algorithm is also applicable to traffic games with non-atomic 
users. 
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Appendix A. 
 
Equation (13a) can be developed as 
2
, 1 1
, ,
0, ,
{ }1ˆ { }
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
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By substituting for  
2
, 1
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It follows that 
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Thus, we have 
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Appendix B. 
 
The expectation of the estimated action values (13a) is given as: 
 
, , 1 , 1 1 , 1
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with 
 , 1 1 1 , 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( , )i i i i i it k t t t k tG u u a x u      
Let 
 1ˆ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ( ), , ( ), , ( )i i i i i i i ik MG u G u G u G u " "  
be a vector of ˆ( ), .i i ikG u k A  Since, for any zx y , it holds that 
( ) ( )i i d  x yG x G y , 
ˆ( )i iG u is Lipschitz continuous with 1L  . 
The noise terms in (13a) is then given as 
  1 11 , 1ˆ { } ( , )i i i i ii it t t t tt k t a k G aU u[ S   ª º  ¬ ¼1  
,{ }
i
k t[ are martingale differences. Therefore, (B.1) is expressed by the following stochastic approximation 
equations: 
 , , 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ( , )i i i i i ik t k t t t t tu u G aO S [      
where the step size parameter tO  satisfies the conditions (13b). Since 
iG is Lipschitz continuous, we assume 
that iG  is bounded, then (B.2) is approximated by the ODE 
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which clearly has a globally asymptotically stable fixed point .ix  That is, ˆ ˆ( , ( )) ( ) 0i i i i it tu a x u u a
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